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An Anatomy of a Cartel:
The National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933
and the Compliance Crisis of 1934
Abstract: This paper explores the nature and causes of the cartel compliance crisis that
befell the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) one year after its passage in 1933.
We employ a simple game-theoretic model of the NIRA’s cartel enforcement mechanism
to show that the compliance crisis can largely be explained by changes in expectations,
rather than a change in enforcement policy. Specifically, firms initially overestimated the
probability that defection would be met with sanction by the cartel’s enabling body, the
National Recovery Administration–including a consumer boycott resulting from loss of
the patriotic Blue Eagle emblem–and complied with the industry cartel rules. As these
expectations were correctly adjusted downward, cartel compliance was lost. We support
this hypothesis empirically with industry-level panel data showing how output and wage
rates varied according to consumer confidence in the Blue Eagle. The analysis provides
insight about cartel performance more generally.
JEL: N42, N62, N82, Ll3, L41, L52
1. Introduction
Modern cartel theory is typically seen as one of the great successes of game-theoretic eco-
nomics. However, despite the appeal of the simple models that fill intermediate theory text-
books, many aspects of real-world cartels remain mysterious. Genovese and Mullin’s (2001)
examination of the early twentieth century US sugar cartel, based on the recorded minutes
of member meetings, found that cartel members rarely behaved as standard repeated-game
models predict–defections were forgiven, punishments were inconsistent, rules were fre-
quently adjusted, and so on. Moreover, contemporary cartel analysis mostly relies on
exogenous shocks to explain cartel formation and breakdown. Comparative-static mod-
els identify conditions under which cartel behavior is or is not consistent with optimizing
behavior by member firms, relying on changes in these conditions to explain changes in
cartel characteristics. For example, the breakdown of previously stable cartels is attributed
to such factors as reduced demand growth, increased demand uncertainty, the appearance
of new entrants, and exogenous technological change (Eckbo, 1976; Rotemberg and Saloner,
1986; Griﬃn, 1989; Marquez, 1994; Dick, 1996; Levenstein and Suslow, 2004, 2006; Suslow,
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2005). Fewer studies examine the internal dynamics of cartel behavior exclusive of changes
in demand, technology, and other external factors.
Following Genovese and Mullin, among others who have employed historical episodes
to gain insight into the contemporary theory of cartel success and failure, we study a hith-
erto neglected aspect of the cartels created by the US National Industrial Recovery Act
(NIRA). Under this legislation, which lasted from June 1933 to May 1935, hundreds of in-
dustries in the manufacturing sector drew up specific cartel codes–all of which were public
record and whose provisions were legally enforceable through government fines and impris-
onment. Many politicians and journalists, and even a few economists, argued that enforced
cartelization would boost prices and wages, stimulating recovery from the Great Depres-
sion. Empirical evidence suggests that the cartels were initially successful in facilitating
collusive outcomes (Hawley, 1966; Weinstein, 1980).1 However, several recent studies of the
NIRA have noted that the cartel agreements systematically broke down less than a year
after they were put into place. Irons (1982), Brand (1989), Alexander (1994, 1997), Krepps
(1997), and Taylor (2002), in addition to contemporary accounts of the legislation, describe
a widespread “compliance crisis” that rendered the legislation ineﬀective long before it was
struck down by the US Supreme Court in 1935. Understanding the nature and causes of
this breakdown provides valuable insight into the internal dynamics of cartel enforcement.
We develop a model highlighting the changes in cartel eﬀectiveness before and after
the compliance crisis of Spring 1934. Our analysis emphasizes the particular importance of
changing expectations in cartel enforcement and punishment–including consumer and firm
perceptions of the Blue Eagle compliance emblem–as a key contributor to cartel breakdown.
Because the government was supposed to punish defectors through a combination of fines
and removal of the Blue Eagle (which was to have brought a consumer boycott), there
1Bittlingmayer (1995) argues, by contrast, that cartelization led to cost reductions that mitigated the
price increases and output restrictions traditionally associated with cartels. More generally, cartelization may
provide eﬃciency gains by reducing uncertainty about rivals’ actions, pooling promotion and distribution
costs, establishing standards, and so on (High, 1984—85). Kinghorn (1996) and Troesken (1989) examine
late twentieth-century German cartels in this context, while Sjostrom (1989) and Pirrong (1992) similiarly
note such cartel eﬃciencies in ocean shipping.
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was no need for the firms themselves to punish defection. However, as it became apparent
to firms that government punishment was unlikely, the few initial unpunished defections
begat further defections, which soon became a title wave of defections so large that even a
few scattered incidences of belated government enforcement could not stop. The broader
implications of the study are relevant not just to formal, state-enforced cartels, but also to
regulatory and other policies that facilitate collusion (e.g., Rothbard, 1984).
2. The Logic of the NIRA
The NIRA was passed by Congress June 16, 1933. Supporters claimed that inter-firm
coordination would promote industrial recovery by ending the “ruinous” or “cut-throat”
competition widely seen as the cause of the Depression. Industry cooperation was viewed
as having been largely successful during World War I and was subsequently portrayed as
the best hope for recovery. Donald Richberg, General Council of the National Recovery Ad-
ministration (NRA), the NIRA’s enabling body, explained that “individual self-protection
must give way to an orderly common eﬀort” and “that thousands of businessmen themselves
should know better than any small group of lawmakers” what specific collective eﬀorts would
best stimulate economic recovery (Irons, 1982, p. 97). Following this logic, manufacturing
industries were required under the Act to write codes of fair competition, subject to some
governmental oversight, specifying detailed rules and regulations for firm behavior.
The NIRA established 765 industry and supplemental codes, each containing several
trade-practice provisions. The most common provision–contained in over 400 codes, in-
cluding those for the pig iron, steel, coal, newsprint, lead, and woodworking machinery
industries–was open price filing, which required firms to file their prices with code authori-
ties and give advance notice of any price changes. As is well known in the modern oligopoly
literature, open price filing discourages competition by revealing firms’ pricing policies to
rivals, allowing them to match the price or otherwise “retaliate” against a price-cutting
firm.2
2See Krepps (1997) for a discussion of the importance of open price filing provisions under the NIRA
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Most industrial codes contained much more specific provisions controlling prices, quanti-
ties, capacity, advertising, hiring, and other policies. A 1937 study found approximately 130
categories of trade-practice provisions contained within the NIRA codes.3 To illustrate, the
Fishing Tackle code ordered that “no manufacturers shall sell or oﬀer for sale any product
at a price less than its ‘reasonable cost of production and distribution’” (article II, section
1). The Boot and Shoe Manufacturing code mandated that price increases accompany any
cost-raising actions such as the use of special shoe boxes or labels (article VIII, section 4).
The Hosiery code required firms to submit weekly shipping reports and monthly reports on
“production, production and selling costs, shipments, stocks on hand, change[s] in equip-
ment, [and] wages and hours of labor” (article VIII). The Iron and Steel code restricted the
production of new capacity: “none of the members of this code shall initiate the construc-
tion of any new blast furnace or open hearth or Bessemer steel capacity” (article V, section
2). The Handkerchief code monitored quality: “No member of the industry shall use the
words ‘Hand Rolled Hem’ to designate that class of handmade hem known as ‘Whipped
Edge,’ which latter term means any hem or edge on which the thread used to fasten same is
whipped or looped around and encloses the entire rolled edge” (article VII, section 14). The
Ice code forbade the “enticement of competitor’s employees” in an attempt to limit labor-
market competition (article IX, section 2, part i). Although the President was directed to
reject codes that “promoted monopolies,” the basic provisions of many codes did just this.
As Brand (1988, p. 117) puts it, “attempts to mitigate competition also opened the door
for businessmen seeking to dispense with competition altogether.”4
While the scope of the regulatory aspects of the specific industry codes was largely
up to the cartel participants, all codes had to include wage-rate increases. Although this
codes.
3U.S. Committee of Industrial Analysis, 1937, p. 74.
4This was particularly true of the early codes. Brand (1988, pp. 106 and 119) notes that with over
700 code applications coming into the government oﬃces within the first six weeks, NIRA administrators
could not review every provision of every code, and therefore the early codes most closely reflect those of an
unrestricted cartel.
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would presumably only exacerbate the unemployment problem, there was a widespread
belief among policy makers, businessmen, and economists that higher wages would increase
purchasing power, demand, production, and ultimately, employment (O’Brien, 1989; Vedder
and Gallaway, 1993; Taylor and Selgin, 1999). The high-wage doctrine claimed that an
increase in wage rates would give workers more money to spend, which would in turn
increase the demand for goods and services. This expanded demand would allow firms
to increase production and, in the end, hire more workers.5 A 1937 study explains the
background of the NIRA’s wage provisions this way:
[There was a] growing emphasis on the idea that business, in its own interest,
needed to pay liberal wages in order to provide the widely distributed purchasing
power which was regarded as necessary if the output of mass production was
to find an adequate market . . . [The high-wage doctrine] found influential
adherents among prominent businessmen, and apparently had appreciable eﬀect
on [firms’] actual wage policies (House Document No. 158, 75th Congress, 1st
Session, p. 2).
To more quickly put the NIRA’s labor provisions into eﬀect, in July 1933 the President’s
Reemployment Act created a temporary “blanket code” which set wage and hour guideposts
that firms were asked to follow until they could pass their own industry codes. Individual
firms would sign a pledge to President Roosevelt stating that they would pay workers at least
$0.35 to $0.40 per hour–a minimum wage that exceeded the average wage paid to common
labor at the time. Industry-specific codes were more flexible, but one Congressional study
of 578 codes found that 338 codes, covering 55 percent of all code employees, specified $0.40
an hour or more. In contrast, only 14 codes, covering under five percent of coded employees,
specified wages of $0.30 an hour or less. In all cases, the law required the industries’ average
wage rates to be increased. Overall, the average wage rose from $0.35 an hour when the
NIRA was passed in June 1933 to $0.43 an hour one year later, an increase of 23 percent.6
5The high-wage doctrine thus diﬀers from modern eﬃciency-wage theories, which argue that higher wage
rates benefit firms by increasing worker productivity. Here the emphasis is strictly on the perceived boost
to aggregate demand.
6Hourly wage rates paid to 25 manufacturing industries–the best data source on monthly wage rates in
the manufacturing sector, the primary sector covered by the NIRA–rose from 45 cents to 58.8 cents, an
increase of nearly 31 percent, during the same period (National Industry Conference Board).
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The NIRA’s codes of fair competition allowed firms to maintain industry cartels far
beyond what would have been feasible on the free market, where cartels generally break
down in the absence of an eﬀective enforcement mechanisms. As is well known, firms
producing similar products can benefit by coordinating to reduce output, increase prices, or
achieve other strategic objectives. However, although decisions to coordinate in this fashion
may be collectively beneficial, they may not be individually rational: firms can generally
increase their own profit by deviating from any agreement, tacit or explicit. Following
Stigler (1964), economists have sought to identify defection and punishment mechanisms
that facilitate collusion. While Stigler focused on the ability to detect deviations from
the collusive outcome, more recent contributions, following Green and Porter (1984), focus
on optimal retaliation, taking the probability of deviation as given. Still, Stigler’s basic
insight–that cartel members structure their agreements, explicitly or tacitly, to discourage
individually rational but collectively harmful behavior–remains one of the best-established
results of modern industrial organization.
The NIRA altered the costs and benefits of coordination by specifying how firms would
collude and providing legal sanctions for deviations from the cartel codes. In a voluntary
cartel, deviations are typically “punished” through retaliation; if one firm cuts its price, the
others cut their prices in response, leading to price competition that harms the defector.
However, because such a punishment harms the retaliating firms as well, the threat of strong
retaliation may not be credible. Indeed, recent studies of early twentieth-century cartels
in the bromine (Levenstein, 1997) and sugar (Genovese and Mullin, 2001) industries show
that deviations were rarely met with massive retaliation, but rather with small, matching
deviations or renegotiation. In a government-enforced cartel, deviation is against the law, so
there may be no need for rivals to retaliate. Moreover, under the NIRA the active regulators
of the codes were generally the industrial executives themselves, who had proper incentives
to monitor participation and could report a rival firm’s defection to the local compliance
board for punishment.
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The NIRA enforced cartelization in two ways. First, the NIRA codes, once signed by
the President, were law. Section 10(b) of the NIRA states that “any such violation of any
such rule or regulation shall be punishable by fine of not to exceed $500 or imprisonment
for not to exceed six months, or both.” Each day a violation continued was considered
a separate oﬀense and hence subject to a new round of penalties. Compliance boards
also required that violators pay wage reparations–usually in the form of back wages to
underpaid laborers–before they were considered in compliance.7 Assuming firms paid
employees the NIRA-suggested $0.40 minimum wage, a $500 fine, even without reparations,
would be the equivalent of 1,250 hours of labor–a severe penalty, particularly for a small
firm. Likewise, the cost to a business owner of spending up to six months in jail was certainly
not trivial. The overall magnitude of this punishment also depends, of course, upon the
expected probability of being caught, the business owner’s discount factor, the business
owner’s subjective aversion to prison, and the expected probability that imprisonment will
be imposed for the violation.8
The second–and, in the view of the Roosevelt Administration, far more important–
enforcement mechanism was the Blue Eagle emblem. Firms deemed to be in full compliance
with their industry’s code of fair competition were allowed to display the emblem on their
storefronts, products, or in their advertisements.9 Intermediate, wholesale, and retail goods
also had to be purchased from NIRA-compliant firms to avoid losing the Blue Eagle. The
text of the NIRA encouraged consumers and producers (and required the federal govern-
ment) to “support and patronize establishments which have also signed this agreement and
are listed as members” of the NRA. The Blue Eagle emblem then supposably allowed con-
7House Document 158, 75th Congress, 1st Session, p. 48.
8 In fact, few business owners were imprisoned for cartel violations. However, this is less important than
potential violators’ expectations of punishment.
9Though the ability to display the Blue Eagle was implicit in all codes, some industry codes included
more detailed provisions on how the emblem could be displayed. The Men’s Clothing Industry code, for
example, said that the Blue Eagle insignia had to be attached to all garments. “The privilege of using
such labels and the issuance thereof may be withdrawn [from] any such manufacture whose operations, after
appropriate hearings . . . shall be found to be in substantial violation” of the cartel code.
7
sumers to diﬀerentiate between firms that had signed codes and remained in compliance
with their cartels and firms that either refused to sign or lost the emblem as punishment
for a violation.
By encouraging consumers to sign a “Statement of Cooperation” reading “I will coop-
erate in the reemployment by supporting and patronizing employers and workers who are
members of the NRA,” Roosevelt essentially called for a nationwide boycott of firms that
did not display the Blue Eagle (U.S. National Recovery Administration, 1933c, p. 278).
Upon signing this pledge, individuals often were given a “Consumer’s Badge of Coopera-
tion,” usually in the form of a small lapel pin displaying Blue Eagle that could be worn as
a patriotic symbol of support for the President’s economic recovery plan. Figure 1 displays
these NRA enforcement devices as well as the Blue Eagle emblem. Contemporary anecdotal
evidence suggests that many consumers heeded Roosevelt’s call, making the Blue Eagle an
important part of the NIRA’s enforcement mechanism. Despite the Administration’s large
emphasis on the Blue Eagle as its primary means of enforcement, the emblem has received
almost no serious attention in the economics literature on the New Deal.
[Figure 1 about here]
To enforce the cartels, the NRA Compliance Division was established in October 1933.
The division had 54 state and branch oﬃces and about 1,400 personnel. Each oﬃce had
both a director of labor compliance and a director of trade-practice compliance. Enforce-
ment proceeded in stages. After receiving a written complaint, the director of the relevant
compliance oﬃce would assign a field oﬃcer to investigate the alleged violation, and, if ap-
propriate, try to convince the firm to come into compliance. If violation continued, the firm
owner would be invited to come into the oﬃce to discuss the case with the local compliance
director. The state and branch oﬃce personnel had little real authority, however; they could
simply explain the rules and threaten further action. Only the National Compliance Direc-
tor in Washington could impose formal sanctions after reviewing the evidence in a closed
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hearing. (The accused was invited to attend the hearing to rebut evidence of the alleged
violation, but the identity of the original accuser was supposed to be never revealed.) If
the hearing determined that a code violation had occurred, the firm would be invited to
sign a certificate promising future compliance. If the firm continued not to comply, the firm
owner would receive a telegram from the NRA Administrator’s oﬃce ordering him to “cease
displaying the Blue Eagle and deliver all NRA insignia in his possession to the local post-
master” (U.S. Committee of Industrial Analysis, 1937, p. 70). The NRA Litigation Division
was then charged with reviewing the case and referring it to the Department of Justice or
the Federal Trade Commission for institution of fines and imprisonment. The NRA itself
had no authority to impose penalties beyond stripping the Blue Eagle from violators.
On October 11, 1933 the first use of the NRA Compliance Division’s enforcement process
made national headlines when Theodore G. Rahutis of Gary, Indiana was sent a telegram
from Washington ordering him to give up the Blue Eagle for violating the NRA’s wage and
hour provisions. The Associated Press quoted a contrite Rahutis saying his restaurant
would “take immediate steps to regain our status with the administration.”10
3. Cartel Behavior under the NIRA: A Strategic Analysis
The NIRA cartel-code structure and enforcement mechanism can be illustrated with a
simple oligopoly model. The NIRA codes attempted to facilitate profit-maximizing collusion
on price, quantity, quality, and other forms of competition, but also had to include higher
wage rates. Participation was mandatory; firms that violated code provisions risked possible
fine, imprisonment, and the loss of the Blue Eagle emblem, leading to a potential consumer
boycott.
Consider first the simplest case, a one-period, n-firm symmetric Cournot game in which
π∗i =
1
nπ
m represents firm i’s payoﬀ from colluding (πm is the industry’s monopoly profit),
πci is firm i’s profit under Cournot competition, π
d
i is firm i’s profit from defecting while the
10The Lansing State Journal, October 11, 1933, 1.
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remaining n − 1 firms cooperate, and πzi is firm i’s profit from cooperating while another
firm defects. Under the standard assumptions that πdi > π
∗
i and π
c
i > π
z
i , the only Nash
equilibrium is the one in which each firm defects.
The NIRA changes the payoﬀ structure as follows. Let γ be the cost of complying
with the NIRA codes–primarily the cost of paying higher wage rates, but also any other
compliance costs, including reporting requirements, the costs of using a less-than-optimal
technology, and the additional cost of buying from NIRA-compliant supplier cartels.11 Let
F be the value of the government fine and prison sentence from defecting from the cartel,
and BE be the perceived cost of lost business from not being able to display the Blue
Eagle. Defectors risk being caught and punished by having their Blue Eagle taken away
and being fined or imprisoned. Assume that defectors (instantaneously) lose BE with
expected probability θ1 and F with expected probability θ2 but avoid having to pay γ.12
Cooperation is a Nash equilibrium as long as
π∗i − γ ≥ πdi − θ1BE − θ2F. (1)
This expression can usefully be rewritten as
θ1BE + θ2F ≥ (πdi − π∗i ) + γ, (2)
where the left-hand side of the inequality represents the expected loss from defecting and the
right-hand side represents the expected gain. This formulation emphasizes the importance
not only of enforcement (θ1and θ2), but also of the substitutability among the sources of
loss from punishment (rivals’ reactions [πdi − π∗i ], the government’s fine [F ], and consumer
pressure [BE ]). For instance, if social pressure to conform to the codes of fair competition
is high–giving the Blue Eagle compliance mechanism “bite”–the fine from defecting need
not be substantial. Ceteris paribus, a compliance crisis could thus be caused by a change
11As noted above, the NIRA codes sometimes allowed, or even mandated, firms to adjust prices in response
to changes in cost; however, unless consumer demand is perfectly inelastic, the firms will be unable to pass
the entire cost increase on to consumers.
12For simplicity we assume that the defecting firm can purchase inputs at market prices from non-compliant
suppliers. Otherwise the defector still bears some franction of γ.
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in firms’ beliefs about of the cost of losing the Blue Eagle, even without a reduction in the
fine for violating the NIRA provisions and the likelihood of being caught.
Expressing π∗i and π
d
i in terms of cost parameters, demand parameters, and n shows how
changes in market conditions, firm heterogeneity, and other factors aﬀect the ability of firms
to cartelize under the NIRA, holding other factors, such as fines and a potential boycott,
constant. Appendix A presents a simple case with linear demand and constant marginal
cost. As seen in the Appendix, the right-hand side of inequality (2)–the gain to firm i from
violating its cartel agreement, ceteris paribus–is increasing in n, decreasing in industry
demand, and (generally) decreasing in industry cost. In other words, as in the original
Stigler (1964) model, the marginal gain from defecting rather than cooperating increases
with the number of firms in an industry, suggesting that NIRA-sponsored collusion should
have been easier to sustain in highly concentrated industries. This squares with Alexander’s
(1994) estimates of “critical concentration ratios” at which industries were able to sustain
collusion before and after the NIRA. It also suggests that collusion becomes harder to sustain
as industry demand falls. Moreover, as shown for the general case by Schmalensee (1987),
and Rothschild (1999), and others, cost asymmetries make collusion harder to sustain;
unless output quotas (continuing with the Cournot example) are set relative to costs, high-
cost firms have a greater incentive to deviate.13 The cross-sectional implication is that the
ability to sustain collusion in a cartel with mandatory wage increases is sensitive to variation
in member firms’ capital-labor ratios. The time-series implication is that compliance will
tend to break down if capital-labor ratios fall, consistent with Alexander’s (1997) general
conclusion that firm heterogeneity played an important role in the failure of the NIRA.
The NIRA was originally set to expire after two years, suggesting a finitely repeated
game. However, many business owners and policy makers expected the NIRA’s cartel-
enabling provisions to be renewed and maintained indefinitely. Given the great deal of
uncertainty about the legislation’s duration, it may be useful to view competition under the
13See Collie (2003) for a contrary view, however.
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NIRA as an infinitely repeated game. For simplicity consider an n-firm infinitely repeated
game in which firm i plays a simple trigger strategy (Friedman, 1971): In period t, cooperate
if all firms j 6= i cooperated in period t− 1; otherwise, revert to Cournot output in period
t and all subsequent periods. Each firm faces a per-period discount rate of δ. Without the
NIRA, firm i gets π∗i · 1(1−δ) by cooperating and πdi + πci · δ(1−δ) by defecting. As a condition
for sustaining cooperation as a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, π∗i · 1(1−δ) must be greater
than or equal to πdi + π
c
i · δ(1−δ) , which reduces to the standard condition that there is not
“too much” discounting, i.e.,
δ ≥ π
d
i − π∗i
πdi − πci
. (3)
With the NIRA, the cooperating firm i gets (π∗i −γi)· 1(1−δ) . By defecting, assuming that
BE and F are imposed with probabilities θ1 and θ2 respectively in the period immediately
following defection, firm i gets πdi +(π
c
i−θ1BE−θ2F ) · δ(1−δ) .14 The condition for sustaining
cooperation is now
(π∗i − γi) ·
1
(1− δ) ≥ π
d
i + (π
c
i − θ1BE − θ2F ) ·
δ
(1− δ) , (4)
which reduces to
δNIRA ≥
(πdi − π∗i ) + γ
(πdi − πci) + θ1BE + θ2F
. (5)
As in the one-shot case, the eﬀect of the NIRA on the ability to sustain cooperation depends
on the relative magnitudes of γ, θ1, θ2, BE, and F . The comparative-statics results are the
same in both the one-shot and the repeated games: the likelihood of successful cartelization
is increasing in θ1, θ2, BE, and F and decreasing in γ.15
14For simplicity, we assume a constant per-period probability of punishment, regardless of the previous-
period outcome. In other words, the probability of being penalized for defection in a given period is the
same as the probability that the penalty will be continued in subsequent periods. Alternatively, we could
assume that F and BE are imposed only in the period immediately following defection, and not afterward
(i.e., firms play a grim-trigger strategy while the government and consumers play tit-for-tat), or that F and
BE are imposed in every period, or that F and BE are imposed with probabilities that are a fuction of time.
None of these alternative modeling strategies change the basic insights described below.
15As in Hinloopen (2003), for the trigger strategy to be eﬀective in sustaining a noncooperative equilibrium
discount rate, the government fine, and the detection probabilities must be suﬃciently low.
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Of course, the grim-trigger strategy, in which punishment continues indefinitely, may not
be realistic. As mentioned above, industry studies by Levenstein (1997) and Genovese and
Mullin (2001) suggest that firms rarely respond to defections with massive retaliation. Small
defections, even if noticed, are often ignored, while more substantial defections are typically
matched in kind. Under the NIRA, firms face an additional disincentive to retaliate: the
punisher itself risks fine, imprisonment, and loss of its own Blue Eagle. An alternative
modeling strategy is to assume that rivals do not respond to defections at all, relying on
government sanction to bring the defector back in line. In this case, the defecting firm’s
payoﬀ is πdi − θ1BE − θ2F . Inequality 5 thus becomes
δNIRA ≥
(πdi − π∗i ) + γ
θ1BE + θ2F
. (6)
The comparative-statics results are the same as above: the likelihood of successful carteliza-
tion is increasing in θ1, θ2, BE, and F and decreasing in γ.16
Of course, interest rates also aﬀect the ability to sustain collusion in a repeated game. As
interest rates rise, the short-term gain from defecting increases and the long-term loss from
being punished falls, ceteris paribus, making collusion more diﬃcult to sustain. Nominal
interest rates remained fairly stable throughout the NIRA period, however, falling slightly
from 4.72 percent in July 1933 to 4.36 percent during the April 1934 compliance crisis.17
The crisis thus does not appear to have been driven by rising interest rates.
The Good-Patriot Eﬀect
16Consistent with Stigler (1964), in the repeated game, as in the one-shot game, collusion becomes
harder to sustain as n increases, suggesting that the entry of new firms into the cartelized industries
could lead to a reduction in compliance. To see this, assume as before that π∗i =
1
4n
(a−c)2
b and
πdi =
1
16
(c−a)(n+1)(−a+c−2g−(a+c+2g)n)
n2b . The Cournot profit π
c
i can be expressed similarly as
1
(n+1)2
(a−c)2
b .
When we substitute these expressions into inequality 5 we get that the right-hand side is increasing in n;
that is, an increase in the number of firms in an industry raises the critical value of δNIRA needed to sustain
collusion in the infinitely repeated game, ceteris paribus. (This applies regardless of our assumption about
firms’ willingness to retaliate.) Even when cartelization is enforced through the twin mechanisms of BE and
F , defections are more likely when there are many firms in a given industry.
17 Incidentally, the price level rose around 7 percent during this period, corresponding to a real interest
rate of approximately −2.5 percent. Ceteris paribus, such low real interest rates should have made collusion
easier to sustain.
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As noted above, firms do not always respond to defections with substantial retalia-
tion. Moreover, the NIRA compliance mechanism provided an important disincentive to
retaliate–retaliation itself invites legal sanction. Moreover, if consumers take the Blue Ea-
gle seriously, then firms may prefer to respond to a defection by highlighting to consumers
their own continued compliance. To see this, imagine that if a defecting firm is caught by
the authorities and loses its Blue Eagle, rivals that stick to the cartel code reap windfall
profits equal to GP–what we call the “good-patriot” eﬀect that a firm receives for coop-
erating in the face of a defection by a rival firm who now loses the patriotic emblem and
invites a consumer boycott. In a symmetric model in which m firms defect, the remaining
n−m firms enjoy GP = mn−mBE.18 Under what conditions is GP large enough to prevent
firms from retaliating against firms that deviate from the NIRA’s provisions?
To simplify the analysis assume that only one firm defects and that the remaining firms
act in concert. In other words, each remaining firm compares its payoﬀ under the Cournot
equilibrium in which all firms have abandoned the NIRA with the “sucker’s payoﬀ” in which
the defection goes unpunished. Matching the defection, as we saw above, yields a payoﬀ
of πci − θ1BE − θ2F (again, assuming that all other firms “punish” by defecting as well).19
Allowing the defection to go unpunished yields πzi −γ+θ1GP , where GP = 1n−1BE. Thus,
continuing to cooperate while one other firm defects is a best response to that defection if
πci − θ1BE − θ2F ≤ πzi − γ + θ1GP , (7)
or, substituting for GP and rearranging terms,
γ − θ2F − θ1BE(
n
n− 1) ≤ π
z
i − πci . (8)
18Recall that BEi is the subjective value of the loss in business that firm i feels it will endure if it loses
its Blue Eagle. Since we are assuming firms are symmetric, the firm will estimate that the loss in business
to any firm j for defecting will be the same as its own, so BEj = BEi. Therefore GPi, will consist of the
extra business the n−m complying firms will divide equally from the mBEi losses.
19Note we are assuming here that industry demand is not fixed; i.e., if all firms in an industry defect, are
caught, and lose their Blue Eagles, consumers boycott the industry entirely. Otherwise the Cournot payoﬀ
for each firm would simply be πc− θ2F , as BE would equal zero. The results below are not sensitive to this
assumption.
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Cournot profit can be expressed as πci =
1
(n+1)2
(a−c)2
b . To solve for π
z
i , assume that
cooperating firms continue to produce their NIRA-sanctioned levels of output (x∗i ), while
the price adjusts to pd. Each cooperating firm thus earns a sucker’s payoﬀ equal to (pd−c0)x∗i .
That is,
πzi = (
1
4
a− c− 2g + (a+ 3c+ 2g)n
n
− c+ g) · 1
n
(
a− c− g
2b
), (9)
which reduces to
πzi =
1
8
(a− c− g) (a− c− 2g + (a− c+ 6g)n)
bn2
. (10)
The right-hand side of inequality (8), πzi − πci , therefore equals
1
8
(a− c− g) (a− c− 2g + (a− c+ 6g)n)
bn2
− 1
(n+ 1)2
(a− c− g)2
b
.
To simplify this expression, let a = 1, b = 1, c = 0, and g = 1. The expression above
reduces to
1
4n
− 1
8n+ 4n2 + 4
,
and inequality (8), the condition under which firms will continue to cooperate in the face
of a defection, becomes
γ − θ2F − θ1BE(
n
n− 1) ≤
1
4n
− 1
8n+ 4n2 + 4
. (11)
Inspection of inequality (11) reveals that the left-hand side is increasing in γ, decreasing
in θ1 and θ2, decreasing in BE, and decreasing in F . The left-hand side is increasing in n,
while the right-hand side is decreasing in n. In other words, the inequality is more likely to
hold (i.e. the cartel is maintained), ceteris paribus, when γ is small, θ1 and θ2 are large, F is
large, BE is large, and n is small. These make intuitive sense: The smaller the compliance
cost, the more likely a firm will stick with the NIRA agreement. Similarly, a large fine,
a high probability of being caught, and a substantial cost from lost business if the Blue
Eagle is lost each make continued compliance more likely. Finally, again consistent with
Stigler’s proposition, collusion is easier to sustain in more concentrated industries, ceteris
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paribus. In short, then, incorporating the good-patriot eﬀect into the analysis reinforces
our main results. Indeed, the possibility of good-patriot rewards increases the likelihood
that firms will allow defections to go unpunished, maintaining partial cooperation with the
NIRA codes instead of a complete breakdown.
The High-Wage Doctrine
So far we have ignored the high-wage doctrine, the belief that paying higher wages would
increase profits by increasing the demand for firms’ products. We have modeled the higher
wage rates mandated by the NIRA as a cost, specifically as the main component of the
compliance cost γ. What happens to the ability to sustain cooperation under the NIRA if
firms regard higher wages, consistent with the high-wage doctrine prevalent at the time, as
a benefit to themselves rather than a cost?
If all firms believe in what we might call an “individual high-wage doctrine”–the belief
that a firm benefits from paying higher wages to its own workers, regardless of what other
firms in the industry are doing–then firms will continue to pay high wages even if they defect
from their cartel and cease abiding by the NIRA’s other provisions (lowering the perceived
cost of γ, making cartels easier to sustain, without changing the other comparative-statics
results). If firms accept the high-wage doctrine but believe the marginal eﬀect of their own
wage payments on industry demand is small, then, defectors will free ride on other firms’
wage policies by paying lower wages to their own workers, making γ the opportunity cost
to firm i of paying higher wages instead of free riding.20
While the actual (nominal) wage rates mandated by the NIRA were rarely amended
throughout the period, an analysis of the high-wage doctrine can help explain a compliance
crisis in at least two ways. First, even if no one believed in the high-wage doctrine, a fall
in the market wage would constitute an increase in the wage component of γ, the cost of
20Taylor and Selgin (1999) show that this desire to force free riders to help boost aggregate demand,
rather than the desire to help workers per se, was an important force behind the push for minimum-wage
laws during the 1920s and 1930s in the U.S.
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paying the NIRA-mandated wage scale, decreasing the likelihood of cooperation.21 Second,
and perhaps more importantly, firms may have initially believed in the high-wage doctrine,
preferring to pay higher wages whether mandated or not, but then lost faith in the merits
of high wages. Changes in beliefs about the benefits of paying higher wages thus could help
explain the breakdown of the NIRA cartels. Taylor and Selgin (1999) cite contemporary
evidence strongly suggesting that some firm owners and policy makers indeed lost faith in
the high-wage doctrine as the depression continued throughout the 1930s.
4. The Compliance Crisis of 1934
The analysis above provides a framework for explaining the NIRA’s enforcement mech-
anism and its potential for success or failure in the achievement of cartel outcomes. In
particular the model can shed light on the causes of the compliance crisis that took place in
the late winter and early spring of 1934, less than a year into the cartel experiment. If we
assume that each firm’s optimal strategy in absence of any cartel enforcement mechanism is
to defect, the model demonstrates that the NIRA’s ability to maintain cartelization hinged
primarily on firms’ expectations of the costs of being caught and punished. These potential
punishment costs include fine, imprisonment, and the stripping of the Blue Eagle emblem.
Is there evidence that these expectations changed? Consider first the loss of the Blue Eagle.
The Eﬀectiveness of the Blue Eagle Emblem
The importance of the Blue Eagle depended primarily on consumers’ willingness to
adhere to Roosevelt’s call to boycott firms lacking the compliance indicator. If firms felt
that consumers would not take the Blue Eagle into account when deciding where to shop,
BE i and GP i are zero, making it more diﬃcult to maintain cartels, ceteris paribus.
As the Blue Eagle compliance badge began appearing on products and in store windows,
the Roosevelt Administration continued a daily push of households to “buy under the Blue
21Of course there is no reliable measure of market wages during the fixed-wage NIRA period. Furthermore,
the moderately high inflation rate likely meant that market nominal wages rose, increasing the likelihood of
cartel compliance.
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Eagle.” In an August 7, 1933 speech, NIRA Chief Administrator Hugh Johnson said, “Where
should you spend? . . . You should spend under the Blue Eagle. If you spend there you are
spending for increased employment. If you spend elsewhere you are hurting the chance” for
economic recovery.22 Contemporary journalist and Roosevelt critic John T. Flynn (1948,
pp. 40—41) reported that “Every instrument of human exhortation opened fire on business
to comply [with the NIRA codes]–the press, pulpit, radio, movies. Bands played, men
paraded, trucks toured the streets blaring the message through microphones. . . . The
President went on the air: ‘In war in the gloom of attack,’ he crooned, ‘soldiers wear a
bright badge to be sure that comrades do not fire on comrades. Those who cooperate in
this program must know each other at a glance. That bright badge is the Blue Eagle.”’
Wolvin’s (1968) speech-communications dissertation examined the Blue Eagle campaign
as a program of “persuasion and coercion.” Interestingly, he notes that the NRA Publicity
Division focused much of its attention on women in promoting the Blue Eagle emblem and
the boycott of firms lacking it. According to Wolvin, “The bugle call had been sounded
to rally the female population of America armed with their pocketbooks” (p. 127). For
example, an August 26, 1933, NRA press release stated:
If the women who control the purse strings of the nation use this mighty in-
strument of mass buying power to support the Blue Eagle, they can assist to
bring about a new order in industry. . . . Women should insist on following
the sign of the Blue Eagle in all their buying. Every time they spend under the
Blue Eagle, they are making jobs for the butcher, the baker, and the candlestick
maker and, thereby, helping to achieve security for themselves and to build a
better and happier America (quoted in Wolvin, 1968, pp. 132—33).
Moreover, the Administration regularly compared the nation’s battle against economic
depression to war, noting that during wartime, citizens are asked to make economic sac-
rifices. The specific sacrifice being asked of consumers was simply to patronize only those
firms that bore the patriotic Blue Eagle emblem, even if they charged higher prices. In
this vain, Ruth Bryan Owen, U.S. Minister to Denmark, broadcast the following appeal to
22Lansing State Journal, August 7, 1933, 1.
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American women on CBS radio in late August 1933:
In other wars the women’s part has been to wait and weep. In this great eﬀort
toward recovery women are playing a vital and important part as the industries
hoist their banners with the Blue Eagle. . . . If every woman within the sound
of my voice should make a resolve, “God helping me, I shall make every eﬀort
to assure the success of this program,” just that is enough to insure the victory
of the greatest of all wars. . . . Mr. President, we will justify the trust you
have put in us, gladly and with a high heart we women will do our part (quoted
in Wolvin, 1968, pp. 126—27).
Contemporary accounts suggest that consumer respect for the Blue Eagle emblem was
substantial and widespread at the onset of the NIRA in the late summer and autumn of
1933. The ubiquitous Blue Eagle, accompanied by the slogan, “We Do Our Part,” graced
store windows, newspapers, chewing gum wrappers, and was even “reverse-sunburned” on
the backs of movie starlets Frances Drake and Toby Wing (Leuchtenburg, 1964, p. 14).
Johnson went on a national tour, complete with motorcades and brass bands, promoting
the Blue Eagle. In September 1933, a ticker tape parade in New York City drew two
million Blue Eagle supporters (Johnson, 1935, p. 267). This prompted the September 12,
1933 edition of U.S. Law Week, a leading legal periodical, to call the Blue Eagle and its
consumer’s badge of cooperation, “a most eﬀective extra-legal weapon.”23 On September 4,
1933 Johnson elaborated the Administration’s approach to cartel enforcement: “Our first
and chief reliance is on public opinion . . . we know that to take away the Blue Eagle is
more severe than any puny fine” (quoted in Wolvin, 1968, pp. 194—95). Relating this to
our model of firm behavior under the NIRA, the contemporary anecdotal evidence clearly
suggests that BE and GP helped to secure compliance during the initial months of the
cartel experiment.
The case of the Ford Motor Company, which refused to sign the NRA automobile code,
helps illustrate the potential costs of a consumer boycott. Henry Ford was vilified as a traitor
in a series of scathing editorials published in many of the nation’s leading newspapers. The
23U.S. Law Week 17, September 12, 1933.
19
Louisville Courier-Journal, for instance, stated that by not signing onto the NRA Ford was
“displaying an astonishing stupidity . . . which may be largely explained by his inordinate
egotism” (September 6, 1933). The Milwaukee Journal wrote: “If Henry Ford is too great
or too good to wear a Blue Eagle, his is out of tune with his country and out of touch with
his fellow Americans” (September 7, 1933). Federal, state, and local government agencies–
important potential buyers of Ford products–joined consumers in the boycott of Ford. For
example, Tennessee state purchasing agent Emmett Hunt announced on August 31, 1933,
that his state would not purchase Ford products until the company signed and abided by the
NRA automobile code. Governor Pinochot of Pennsylvanian and Governor Brann of Maine
announced the next day that their states would also boycott Ford products and many other
state and local governments followed suit (Wolvin, 1968, pp. 193—94). This was precisely
the kind of publicity and powerful consumer sentiment the NRA had hoped to create. As
Johnson noted, “The time is coming when somebody is going to take one of these Blue
Eagles oﬀ someone’s window, and that’s going to be a sentence of economic death.”24
While the Blue Eagle campaign appears to have initially succeeded in convincing firms
to comply with the cartels or face the consequence of a painful boycott, the wave of patriotic
support apparently did not last. Brand (1988, p. 106) notes that by early 1934 consumers
had experienced a “decline in moral enthusiasm” for the NRA and its provisions. Hawley
(1966, p. 68) likewise notes there was a “reversal in public sentiment” toward the NRA
around the same time. After this reversal the Blue Eagle appears to have lost much, if
not all, of economic significance. As a contemporary government study noted: “The loss
of the right to display the Blue Eagle, to the extent that public interest in patronizing
only enterprises which displayed it waned, gradually became a penalty of little consequence”
(Committee on Industrial Analysis, 1937, p. 70, emphasis added). Thus firms’ perception of
reduced consumer enthusiasm for the emblem, represented in our analysis by a reduction in
BE (and hence GP), could have played an important role in causing the compliance crisis
24Lansing State Journal, August 11, 1933, 9.
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of early 1934.
Empirical Evidence on the Role of the Blue Eagle
Systematic empirical evidence on firms’ beliefs regarding the value of the Blue Eagle is
diﬃcult to obtain. One proxy for a firm’s attitude toward the importance of the emblem
is its willingness to pay to display it. Firms complying with the NRA cartel codes had
the right not only to display the Blue Eagle emblem on their products and in their store
windows, but also to include it in their advertisements. Beginning in late July 1933, the
Blue Eagle emblem began appearing in print advertisements of NRA-covered firms. To
measure its importance, we examined a diverse sample of eight daily newspapers, Atlanta
Journal-Constitution, Chicago Tribune, Christian Science Monitor, Lansing State Journal,
New Orleans Times-Picayune, New York Times, San Francisco Examiner, and Washington
Post. We observe the first 25 advertisements each Thursday between August 3, 1933 and
June 6, 1935, just after the NIRA was ruled unconstitutional, and record how many of these
displayed the Blue Eagle emblem. Thus each weekly observation records the percentage of
200 advertisements that display the patriotic emblem. Figure 2 shows a five-week central
moving average of the percentage of ads carrying the patriotic emblem during the pertinent
months.25
[Figure 2 about here]
The data suggest that firms’ beliefs in consumer enthusiasm for the Blue Eagle emblem
were strongest in September and October of 1933 when as many as 44 percent of ads
contained the emblem (a significant number considering that the NIRA applied only to
manufacturing and retail firms, with a few minor exceptions). A noticeable drop-oﬀ began
in November and December 1933. Table 1 shows the monthly averages, by newspaper, for
25The first two and final two observations reported are actual numbers rather than the five-week central
moving average.
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the last five months of 1933. In all but one case the monthly average declined between
October and November, and in all eight cases it declined between November and December.
[Table 1 about here]
During this time the NIRA faced a wave of challenges. For example, on November 27,
1933, eighty-five percent of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania restaurants voluntarily surren-
dered their Blue Eagles saying that the restaurant code was bringing financial ruin. Then
on December 2, 1933, the entire Lincoln, Nebraska compliance board resigned in protest of a
lack of enforcement resources from Washington. A few days later, members of the Lowell,
Massachusetts compliance board likewise resigned. Such episodes, which made national
news, gave the NRA and its Blue Eagle symbol a black eye and likely played an important
role in the apparent decline in enthusiasm for the emblem. By January 1934, only around
22 percent of ads, or around half of the number at its earlier peak, displayed the Blue
Eagle. Another small wave of the emblem’s disappearance began in late May and June of
1934. Interestingly, this is correlated with the release of a report by the National Recovery
Review Board, headed by Clarence Darrow, which painted the NRA in an unfavorable light
as having supported monopolies at the expense of small businesses. By January 1935, and
for the remaining five months in which the Blue Eagle continued to be the oﬃcial symbol
of compliance with the NIRA, only around 5 percent of all ads carried the emblem.
That so many firms went to the initial eﬀort of including the emblem in their advertisements–
and in many cases, the major theme of the ad was simply to proclaim the firm’s compliance
with the NIRA rather than information about the quality or price of their product–in the
fall and winter of 1933—34 suggests that firms believed that the Blue Eagle carried weight
with consumers. Such a belief, coupled with a fear that defection from the NIRA could re-
sult in loss of the emblem, would clearly have made compliance with the cartels more likely.
Perhaps more telling, the fact that the percentage of advertisements carrying the emblem
fell so dramatically in the Winter and Spring of 1934, even though it was still the oﬃcial
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emblem of compliance, strongly suggests that the Blue Eagle lost much of its behavioral
significance and hence lost its ability to help firms sustain collusion.
An examination of the Blue Eagle in advertisements of some specific firms across this
time period may also be of value. While collecting our weekly observations, we tracked
the ads of several specific firms looking for any patterns in behavior. We searched for
two patterns explicitly. First, we wanted to confirm that what Figure 2 measures is the
adoption and subsequent dropping of the Blue Eagle in advertisements of the same firms
rather than a change in the composition of advertising firms in the sample. It was clear
from our analysis that indeed it was the case that individual firms in our sample displayed
and then dropped the emblem. For example, Moore’s Retail consistently displayed the
Blue Eagle in its San Francisco Examiner advertisements until February 8, 1934, and then
dropped it in all subsequent advertisements. Likewise Fanny Farmer Candies regularly
displayed the emblem in its advertisements in the Christian Science Monitor until March
29, 1934 after which time it stopped. There were some exceptions as Holmes Retail regularly
included the Blue Eagle in its advertisements in the New Orleans Times Picayune all the
way until June of 1935, when we stopped collecting data since the legislation had been ruled
unconstitutional.
The second pattern we explicitly looked for was whether the dropping of the emblem
from advertisements generally corresponded to the firm employing a new advertisement or
whether the emblem was removed from an existing advertisement. It seems a far stronger
statement of a firm’s lack of enthusiasm for the emblem for it to actually remove the Blue
Eagle from an existing ad than it is to simply decide not to include it in a new one. While
we looked for this pattern anecdotally in all the papers, we were a bit more systematic with
respect to this question for the Christian Science Monitor. We tracked seven companies
that both had relatively stable advertisements in the Monitor and displayed and dropped
the Blue Eagle during the sample. Of these seven, five dropped the Blue Eagle from an
existing advertisement, while for the other two the dropping of the emblem corresponded
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with a change in advertisement. Generally speaking, from our analysis of advertisements
from all eight papers we conclude that the emblem’s disappearance was by no means limited
to a change in advertisements.
To see if the fading importance of the Blue Eagle contributed to cartel failure, as de-
scribed in our model, we construct an industry-level panel of monthly data on output and
wage rates, the former as a measure of firms’ success in obtaining collusive outcomes and the
latter as a measure of compliance with the NIRA’s wage provisions. For the output regres-
sions, we use the 66 industries in the National Bureau of Economic Research Macrohistory
Database that were covered by a specific NIRA code from January 1927 to December 1937.
Our wage regressions use the 30 of these industries for which average hourly earnings data
are also reported.
For each industry in our sample we obtain from the corresponding NIRA code of fair
competition the date in which the industry code was passed. The opening pages of each
code generally listed the specific subcategories of firms or production that fell under the
jurisdiction of the code, helping us to match each industry to its specific cartel code. Table 2
lists the 66 industries in the sample, marking with an asterisk the subsample of 30 industries
for which we also have average hourly wage data, and the date that each industry’s code
was passed. From this information we create dummy variables for each industry’s pre-
code months (from July 1933 to the month the industry code was passed [if a code was
passed after the 16th of the month we counted that month as a pre-code month]) and the
code months (from the month of code passage to May 1935, when the NIRA was ruled
unconstitutional).
[Table 2 about here]
To control for important non-NIRA factors that could have influenced output and hourly
earnings, each regression includes the real money supply, real government spending, real
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government revenue, and time trend variables.26 We also include fixed eﬀects to control for
omitted variables that vary across industries but do not change over time. One important
factor that both could have aﬀected industry decisions and varied over time is capacity uti-
lization. For example, an industry operating near 100 percent of its capacity would likely
have a very diﬀerent optimal response to changing economic conditions or institutions (such
as cartelization) than one operating at only 20 percent capacity. We create a capacity uti-
lization proxy by dividing monthly production by the industry’s maximum level of monthly
production between January 1927 and December 1929. In each regression, we include our
capacity utilization proxy lagged one period so that its value is exogenous to movements
within a particular month.
Table 3 reports the results of GLS panel regressions employing fixed eﬀects and
cross-section weights. To control for serial correlation we use log diﬀerences (percentage
changes) rather than levels. The results of specifications (1) and (3) suggest that output
growth fell and real average houlry earnings growth rose during the pre-code months, when
firms were free to negotiate over the contents of their industry’s cartel code, and during
the months in which the code was in eﬀect (the earnings increases are not statistically
significant during the industry-code months, however). This suggests that the NIRA was
generally successful in its quid pro quo of facilitating cartels in exchange for higher average
hourly earnings.
[Table 3 about here]
In specifications (2) and (4) we add our monthly measure of the Blue Eagle’s importance
as proxied by its appearance in newspaper advertisements. Since our regressions employ
monthly data, we use the moving average of the first observation of each month for our
analysis. As the table shows, output growth fell more sharply, and real average hourly
earnings grew significantly faster, when the Blue Eagle was viewed by firms as being eco-
26The results are not sensitive to the inclusion of the time trend.
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nomically important. Moreover, when one controls for the prominence of the Blue Eagle
emblem, output growth rose (rather than fell) and earnings fell (rather than rose) during
the NIRA code months. These results oﬀer empirical support to the notion that perceptions
of the Blue Eagle emblem played an important role in cartel complaince and breakdown
under the NIRA.
As with any empirical study of this period the results should be interpreted with cau-
tion as there were several important institutional changes that cannot easily be measured
and controlled for. Moreover, the causality could run in the opposite direction–as the
NIRA cartels fell apart, the Blue Eagle became less important. (Unfortunately, we lack
suﬃcient time-series observations under the NIRA to reliably conduct Granger causality
tests.) However, we also find that the Blue Eagle’s importance is negatively correlated
with firms’ defections from their cartels. Figure 3 reports the number of weekly complaints
about trade-practice provisions received in compliance field oﬃces between November 1933
and January 1935. We take this to be a reasonable proxy for number of defections. The
correlation coeﬃcient between trade-practice complaints and the percent of advertisements
carrying the Blue Eagle is —0.608 and is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Thus
the more important the Blue Eagle emblem, the fewer the defections. This oﬀers further
evidence that firms’ perceptions of the value of the Blue Eagle emblem helped drive cartel
success and failure under the NRA.
[Figure 3 about here]
Government Enforcement through Fine and Imprisonment
According to a 1937 government study the NRA’s methods of “education and concil-
iation, at first relatively successful in bringing about compliance, gradually became less
eﬀective [so that] greater emphasis was placed by [the] NRA upon recourse to actions in
the courts.”27 Figure 3 reveals that complaints of code violations increasingly flooded NRA
27U.S. Committee of Industrial Analysis, 1937, p. 70.
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compliance oﬃces, spiking in April and May of 1934. Johnson had a strong aversion to
litigation and had hoped all along that the Blue Eagle emblem, in and of itself, would be
suﬃcient to facilitate code compliance. Furthermore, the NRA’s lawyers generally hesitated
in pursuing violators too vigorously, fearing the legislation might not hold up in court. As
Irons (1982, pp. 34-35) notes, this combination of factors made the Litigation Division slow
to pursue cartel violators.
In early 1934, it became obvious that some new action was needed to stop widespread
defections. Blackwell Smith, the NRA’s chief lawyer, prepared a staﬀ memo outlining
what he called a “Machiavellian” strategy of “threats” and “tricks” designed to “bring to
swift justice locally well known chiselers.”28 This strategy–perhaps best called “smoke and
mirrors”–entailed pursuing a handful of high-profile targets to give the illusion that pun-
ishment of violators was widespread. To illustrate this strategy in practice, on February 28,
1934, Cornelia Bryce Pinchot, wife of the Pennsylvania governor Giﬀord Pinchot, charged
that “Blue Eagles are adorning sweat shops in hundreds of towns in Pennsylvania” because
of the lack of NRA enforcement against violators. At the same event, Louis Waldman,
spokesman for the Socialist Party said, “We support the NRA. . . but it has failed . . . be-
cause of the methods Gen. Johnson has used for its enforcement.”29 The very next day, the
NRA responded by publicly calling for the removal of the Blue Eagle emblem from 12 large
firms and referred 10 of these cases to the Department of Justice and one to the Federal
Trade Commission for pursuit of fines and imprisonment.30 While this flurry of NRA activ-
ity made national headlines, in hopes of spreading the illusion of widespread enforcement,
the reality was that such broad action was the exception and not the rule.
The NRA Compliance and Litigation Divisions also employed what we call a “pick-your-
battles-wisely” strategy. When compliance oﬃcers pursued a cartel violator in court, they
28Blackwell Smith to Averell Harriman, April 9, 1934, memo file, January—April 1934, Box 45, Richberg
Papers, LC.
29Both quotes are from The Washington Post, March 1, 1934, 1.
30The Washington Post, March 2, 1934, 1.
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generally attempted to do so in jurisdictions with judges expected to be NIRA supporters.
Of the cases that made it to district courts on constitutional grounds, 71 percent of Re-
publican judges ruled against the NRA, while 80 percent of Democratic judges ruled in its
favor (Irons, 1982, p. 56). Because court losses could hurt cartel compliance (represented in
our model by a drop in θ2i), NRA compliance oﬃcers had to consider carefully not only the
severity of a defection, but also the likelihood that punishment could be secured in court
when considering whether or not to take legal action.
By the time the legislation was ruled unconstitutional in May 1935, NRA state and
branch oﬃces had processed a total of 155,102 complaints. Of these, 88,872 were deemed
valid but handled by “education and [threatened] coercion” in state oﬃces. Only 7,136
cases were referred to the National Compliance Board in Washington and of these, 2,064
cases were referred to the Litigation Division. Only 564 cases reached the courts and many
of these were still pending, and hence dropped, after Schechter.31
The Nature and Causes of the Compliance Crisis: Implications of the Model
Incorporating these facts into the game-theoretic model presented above strongly sug-
gests that changing perceptions, rather than changes in enforcement, are most responsible
for the compliance crisis. The stated penalties of a $500 fine and up to six months in jail
for cartel violations remained in place throughout the duration of the NIRA, so our F can
be viewed as constant. Furthermore, from the above figures on litigation and code violation
complaints, the actual probability of being caught and fined or imprisoned does not seem to
have changed significantly over time either. As the case numbers suggest, the NRA Com-
pliance Division rarely acted on complaints beyond politely asking violators to come into
compliance. Instead, θ1 and θ2, the expected probabilities of being caught and punished,
appear to have fallen from incorrectly high levels to more realistic ones during late 1933
and early 1934.
31U.S. Committee on Industrial Analysis, 1937, p. 72.
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This raises an important question: which firms defected first? The obvious answer
is that the first firms to defect were those with better information about the true values
of θ1 and θ2. Suppose, for example, we allow firms to have diﬀerent beliefs about the
likelihood of punishment. Assume that each firm i has beliefs θi1 and θ
i
2 drawn randomly
from normal distributions of θ1 and θ2 with means θ¯1 and θ¯2 and standard deviations σi1 and
σi2, respectively. In the initial periods of the game, the firms most likely to defect are those
whose beliefs θi1 and θ
i
2 are at the bottom of the respective distributions. In subsequent
periods, firms in continued compliance observe that defectors are punished less frequently
than expected, and these firms adjust their beliefs about punishment by adopting lower
values of θi1 and θ
i
2, leading to additional defections, and so on.
Industry case studies strongly support such a sequence of events. According to David
T. Mason, executive oﬃcer of the Lumber Code Authority, the “code worked well for many
months, during which time undoubtedly the vast majority of the industry did comply
[mainly] because they feared the action which would be taken upon failure to comply.”
However, Mason noted, a few violations sowed “the seeds of trouble. . . . As time went on
with lack of action by government enforcement agencies . . . [violators] became more brazen
and outspoken, encouraging their neighbors in similar violations” (Mason, 1935, p. 23). Ma-
son noted that by June 1934, a full-fledged crisis left the code virtually ineﬀective. Although
the NRA Litigation Division did belatedly push the Department of Justice to prosecute a
few lumber code violators, Mason suggested that this should have been done from the start.
“Such action would have been in accordance with the military theory that the first action
toward a raw recruit is to teach him discipline and respect for his organization” (p. 24).
Similar events occurred in the macaroni industry. Alexander (1997) notes that head
of the macaroni code, G. G. Hoskins, pleaded with government compliance administra-
tors throughout 1934 to prosecute large macaroni firms who were allegedly violating the
macaroni code’s price provisions. However, according to Alexander (p. 331), the NRA
was “divided against itself, with various departments rendering conflicting opinions about
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the legality of the code provisions.” Alexander cites a January 1935 memo from Hoskins,
in which he noted that the cartel “membership at large has come to believe that all our
statements that the Code could be enforced have been false” (p. 332).
The lack of enforcement action from Washington also served to alienate members of
local compliance boards, further exacerbating the compliance crisis. The December 1933
episodes mentioned earlier whereby the NRA Compliance Boards of Lincoln, Nebraska and
Lowell, Massachusetts resigned in protest illustrate the point. Members of the Lincoln
board noted that while the local board had relayed several cases of non-compliance to the
National Compliance Board in Washington for removal of the Blue Eagle and further legal
action, “there has been nothing done.” The local board estimated that only 30 percent of
Lincoln firms were in compliance with the codes even though almost all firms displayed
the Blue Eagle.32 In Lowell, the Board’s letter of resignation noted, “We repeatedly have
requested cooperation and assistance which has not been aﬀorded us [from Washington]
which has been annoying and embarrassing.”33 Because cases such as these made national
news, they clearly had an impact upon both the perceived probabilities that government
enforcement would be forthcoming in the face of a violation and consumers’ actual response
to “buy under the Blue Eagle” as measured in our model by BE and GP.
Essentially, it appears that in the summer and autumn of 1933 our key inequalities–
equation (1) for the one-shot or finitely repeated game and equation (6) for the infinitely
repeated game–held, implying that collusion was a Nash equilibrium. Over time, however,
some firms’ subjective evaluations of θ1, θ2, and BE changed (recall the actual value of
F itself did not change) so that the expected payoﬀ from defection came to exceed the
expected payoﬀ from compliance. Interestingly, this does not appear to have happened all
at once. Some business owners appear to have continued to view the NIRA enforcement
mechanism as having weight so that the inequality in equation (8), which provides the
32Washington Post, December 2, 1933, 8.
33Washington Post, December 12 1933, 1.
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condition under which firms will continue to abide by a cartel agreement in the face of a
defection, held. Suggesting an important role for θ2 in particular, a 1937 study concluded
that “compliance tended to break down in industries, and in areas generally, in which an
alleged violator was allowed to continue non-compliance with impunity” (Committee on
Industrial Analysis, 1937, p. 72). As defection became more common it became increasing
clear that θ1, θ2, BE, and GP were actually quite small, and cartel maintenance became
exceedingly diﬃcult. In short, the NIRA’s enforcement mechanisms appear to have worked
initially, but began to fail as firms realized that punishment, both from the government
and from patriotic consumers, was unlikely. Of course, the fact that firms were still exempt
from antitrust law could have allowed some industries–those for which collusion was a Nash
equilibrium even in the absence of the NIRA codes–to maintain eﬀective cartels after the
compliance crisis.
The Model in Light of Existing NIRA Literature
Our analysis of the NIRA cartel enforcement mechanism and compliance crisis strongly
complements recent empirical studies of the NIRA. Alexander (1994, 1997) and Krepps
(1997), both using industry-level data on price-cost margins, find that the eﬀects of the
NIRA varied widely across industries. Both authors attribute this largely to diﬀerences in
enforceability of certain provisions of codes and to structural diﬀerences within industries
aﬀecting the gains to defection. Krepps, for example, finds that industries with codes that
contained the relatively easily enforceable provision of open-price filing fared much better in
raising price-cost margins than those that did not. This suggests that the NIRA compliance
mechanism itself was not able to enforce most other code provisions.
Alexander (1997), using the percentage change in establishment size between 1929 and
1933 as a proxy for cost heterogeneity, finds that cost heterogeneity is negatively correlated
with profit (proxied by percent changes in dollars available for fixed costs between 1933 and
1935 and percentage change in price cost margin for same time).34 Consistent with the no-
34Defection, Alexander notes, was likely more attractive to a low-cost firm in a heterogeneous-cost industry
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tion of a crisis in compliance, Alexander notes that, “The NRA never took a decisive stand
on enforcement . . . as soon as low-cost firms realized they were able, they reverted back to
competition on the basis of low costs” (p. 327). Complementary to our general conclusions,
this suggests that the NIRA enforcement mechanism worked initially, but became largely
inept after firms no longer feared punishment. While our paper complements the exist-
ing literature, it adds a detailed examination of the NIRA cartel enforcement mechanism,
particularly the role played by consumer and producer beliefs in the power of the Blue
Eagle emblem, as well as an examination of specific enforcement strategies employed by
the NRA Compliance and Litigation Divisions. Furthermore, our study provides the most
detailed analysis of the nature and causes of one of the defining moments of the NIRA—the
compliance crisis of 1934.
5. Conclusion
Grossman (2004, p. 7) notes that “in any discussion of cartel behavior, it is easier to
ask the questions than to find clear-cut answers.” While the so-called “compliance crisis”
has been a key feature of recent empirical analyses of the National Industrial Recovery Act,
scholars have done little in the pursuit of answers behind its nature and causes. To gain
general insight into the mechanics of cartel success and failure we explore the compliance
crisis that befell the government-sponsored cartels of the 1930s, when over 700 industries
had their own specific cartel code passed into law. The game-theoretic model developed
here demonstrates the importance of expectations of punishment, rather than the objective
probabilities, for the success and failure the NIRA cartels. Clearly, as long as firms ex-
pected to be punished for violating their cartel codes and expected to lose customers upon
being stripped of the Blue Eagle emblem, firms’ best responses were generally to comply
with the NIRA cartel codes. However, as consumers lost enthusiasm for the Blue Eagle,
than for an average firm in a homogeneous-cost industry. While admitting that her analysis is a “very
rough” attempt to test empirically the eﬀects of heterogeneity on cartelization, Alexander notes her analysis
is primarily meant to oﬀer some empirical support to her macaroni case study and her model on the eﬀects
of cost heterogeneity.
32
firms realized that the NIRA compliance mechanism–including the Blue Eagle emblem–
was largely innocuous, and firms began to defect from the cartel. When these defections
went unpunished, other firms lowered their evaluations of punishment, leading to further
defections.
By the time the NRA Litigation Division began referring violators for prosecution in
earnest, the compliance crisis was too far underway. The NRA Compliance and Litigation
Divisions attempted to compensate with what we have called the “smoke-and-mirrors” and
“pick-your-battles-wisely” strategies. Specifically, the NRA attempted to prosecute a few
high-profile firms in jurisdictions with NIRA-friendly judges. However, with thousands of
complaints flooding field oﬃces each month, these strategies were not enough to make the
threat of prosecution credible in the eyes of most cartel participants. The lethal combination
of declining enthusiasm for the Blue Eagle emblem and declining expectations of punishment
ultimately doomed the NIRA cartel experiment.
Our model and empirical work illustrate the main features of this argument, but they
are of course not definitive. The model can be extended in several ways. For example,
following Hinloopen (2003), we could model belief formation explicitly, rather than treat
beliefs as exogenous shift parameters.35 More generally, we can try to model additional ways
in which the legal and competitive environments changed during the course of the NIRA.
As Levenstein and Suslow (2006) point out in their recent survey of empirical research
on cartels, the key to cartel stability over time is flexibility–cartels tend to stay together
when firms can adjust cartel agreements in light of changing economic conditions. Our
model highlights the most important of these changes during the NIRA period–consumer
beliefs about the Blue Eagle emblem and firms’ beliefs about government enforcement–
but other changes could be important as well. Additional empirical work on the spatial
35Hinloopen (2003) studies price-fixing cartels and models the probability of detection and government
fine as a function of cartel characteristics, the resources available to the enforcement authority, and the
number of periods in which the cartel has been in operation. The qualitative results of his analysis are
similar to ours.
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distribution of cartel defections under the NIRA would be valuable to test the extent of a
geographic “contagion eﬀect” in cartel breakdown. We look forward to pursuing these and
other extensions in future work.
34
Appendix A: Comparative-Static Analysis of One-Period Model
Consider a one-period, n-firm symmetric Cournot model with linear demand given by
p = a− bX where p is price, X is total industry output, and a and b are parameters. Firms
produce output x at a constant marginal cost c. When complying with the NIRA, the firm’s
costs increase from c to c0 (where γ = (c0 − c)x).
Under perfect collusion firm i produces output x∗i =
1
n(
a−c0
2b ), representing one nth of
the monopoly output. The market price p∗ = 12(a + c
0) (the monopoly price) and firm i’s
profit π∗i =
1
4n
(a−c0)2
b .
If firm i deviates by maximizing its own profit, assuming that other firms continue to
produce their shares of the collusive output, then firm i chooses xi to maximize (a− b(xi+
X∗−i))xi − cxi, where X∗−i represents the (cartel-level) output of all firms j 6= i. We assume
that the defecting firm avoids the costs of compliance γ, thus facing per-unit costs of c
rather than c0. The first-order condition is a − 2bxi − bX∗−i − c = 0, which implies that
xdi =
a−bX∗−i−c
2b . Noting that X
∗
−i can be expressed as
n−1
n (
a−c0
2b ), letting g = c
0 − c, and
making the appropriate substitutions, we obtain the following solution:
xdi =
1
4
a− c+ an− nc
nb
, (A1)
pd =
1
4
a− c− 2g + (a+ 3c+ 2g)n
n
, and (A2)
πdi =
1
16
(c− a) (n+ 1) (c− a+ 2g − (a+ c− 2g)n)
n2b
. (A3)
Note that as expected, firm i’s profit from defecting, πdi , is greater than its profit from
cooperating, π∗i .
We can now do some comparative statics on the eﬀectiveness of the NIRA under various
market conditions. For instance, the right-hand side of inequality (2) in the main text above
can be expressed as
1
16
(c− a) (n+ 1) (c− a+ 2g − (a+ c− 2g)n)
n2b
− 1
4n
(a− c)2
b
+ γ,
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which is an increasing function of n.36 a decreasing function of a, and a (generally) decreas-
ing function of c. If we model changes in industry demand as vertical, parallel shifts in the
demand curve, then changes in demand are captured by changes in a, just as changes in
the industry’s cost structure are captured by changes in c.
36Note that γ = (c0 − c)x∗; i.e., the cost of compliance is computed assuming the firm is producing its
cartel-specified level of output.
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Figure 2: Appearance of the Blue Eagle 
Data are based on a sample of the first 25 advertisements in eight newspapers (200 ads per 
observation) from every Thursday between August 3, 1933 and June 6, 1935.  Newspapers:  Atlanta 
Journal-Constitution, Chicago Tribune, Christian Science Monitor, Lansing State Journal, New 
Orleans Times-Picayune, New York Times, San Francisco Examiner, and Washington Post. 
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Figure 3: Trade-Practice Provision Complaints 
Source: U.S. National Recovery Administration, Research and Planning Division, Charts on the 
Operation of the National Industrial Recovery Act, Chart 71.  
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Table 1 
Percent of Advertisements Displaying Blue Eagle Emblem,  
August-December 1933 
      
 Monthly averages 
 August September October November December
Lansing State Journal 0.19 0.43 0.44 0.36 0.14 
Chicago Tribune 0.50 0.65 0.57 0.60 0.56 
New York Times 0.20 0.34 0.20 0.15 0.13 
Washington Post 0.24 0.26 0.39 0.30 0.20 
Christian Science Monitor 0.17 0.19 0.30 0.22 0.21 
Atlanta Journal-Constitution 0.30 0.35 0.33 0.26 0.29 
New Orleans Times-Picayune 0.29 0.55 0.54 0.42 0.38 
San Francisco Examiner 0.41 0.65 0.52 0.47 0.36 
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Table 2 
Date of Industry Code Passage, Sampled Industries 
 
Industry Date Code Both Wage +  Industry Date Code Both Wage + 
 Passage Output Data   Passage Output Data 
Alcohol 8/21/1934    Meat 1/4/1934 * 
American Cheese 2/2/1935    Men's Shoe 10/3/1933 * 
Asphalt 11/6/1933   Merchant Pig Iron 8/19/1933 * 
Auto Parts 11/8/1933    Metal 11/2/1933  
Beef and Veal 1/4/1934  *  Milk, New York 1/4/1934  
Bituminous Coal 9/18/1933   Newsprint 11/17/1933 * 
Book 2/17/1934    Paper and Pulp 11/17/1933 * 
Brick 3/26/1934   Paper Production 11/17/1933 * 
Butter 1/4/1934    Passenger Cars 8/26/1933 * 
Cement 11/27/1933   Pig Iron 8/19/1933 * 
Cheese 2/2/1935    Pork 1/4/1934 * 
Chemicals 2/10/1934  *  Raw Silk 10/7/1933  
Condensed Milk 1/4/1934    Rayon 8/26/1933 * 
Construction 1/31/1934   Rayon Yarn 8/26/1933 * 
Copper 4/21/1934   Refined Lead 5/24/1934  
Corn Grindings 1/4/1934    Rice  1/4/1934  
Cotton 7/9/1933  *  Rubber 12/15/1933 * 
Cotton Goods 11/17/1933    S+C Tires 12/21/1933 * 
Crude Petro, Appl.  8/19/1933    Slab Zinc 3/26/1935  
Crude Petro, RTS 8/19/1933    Small Cigarettes 2/9/1935  
Douglas Fir Lumber 8/19/1933 *  S. Pine Lumber 8/19/1933  
Evaporated Milk 1/4/1934    Steel Ingot 8/19/1933 * 
Fertilizers 10/31/1933    Steel Sheet 8/19/1933 * 
Fine Paper 11/17/1933  *  Tire Pneumatic Case 12/21/1933 * 
Glass 10/3/1933   Tire Tubes 12/21/1933 * 
Ice Cream 1/4/1934    Total Shoe 10/3/1933 * 
Large Cigars 6/19/1934    Trucks 8/26/1933 * 
Lead Ore  5/24/1934    Wheat Flour 1/4/1934  
Leather 9/7/1933  *  Women's Shoes 10/3/1933 * 
Locomotives 2/16/1934    Woodworking Mach. 5/14/1934 * 
Lubricants 8/19/1933    Wool 7/26/1933 * 
Lumber 8/19/1933   Wrapping Paper 11/17/1933 * 
Machinery 3/17/1934  *  Zinc Ore  3/26/1935  
 
Notes:  We employ output data for all 66 industries above.  For the 30 industries with an asterisk, we 
also have average hourly earnings data.   
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Table 3 
Impact of the Blue Eagle Emblem on Output and Wage Rates 
 
Dependent variables as defined in the text. Monthly observations from January 1927 to December 
1937. T-statistics in parentheses. ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels, 
respectively. All regressions employ industry fixed effects and cross-section weights.  Standard errors 
calculated under a Period SUR covariance method.   
 
          Dependent Variables      
                                             Log Difference                        Log Difference  
     Industry Output                Industry Real Average Hourly Earnings 
          (1)      (2)   (3)   (4) 
 
Constant  0.07142**  0.07155**   –0.00623** –0.00647** 
    (11.02)    (11.10)    (–4.87)  (–5.07) 
 
Pre-Code NIRA Months  –0.01182*  0.01949**   0.02713**  0.01879** 
(July 1933-Code Passage)    (–2.42)   (2.61)    (6.69)   (4.10) 
 
NIRA Code Months –0.00641**  0.01373**   0.00104 –0.00416** 
(Industry Code Passage   (–3.16)   (3.26)     (1.18)  (–3.48) 
through May 1935) 
 
DLog Money Supply   –0.11432*  –0.10717   0.12310** 0.12058** 
     (–2.09)    (–1.92)     (5.97) (5.86) 
 
DLog Government Spend   0.00715**  0.00870**   0.00320** 0.00288** 
     (2.30)    (2.77)     (5.97)  (5.89) 
DLog Government Revenue    0.00073  0.00046  -0.00041 -0.00040 
     (0.45)    (0.29)    (-1.53)  (-1.47) 
 
Time Trend   0.00006*  0.00006   0.00002** 0.00002** 
     (2.14)    (1.96)    (2.92)  (3.18) 
 
Industry Capacity   –0.11638  –0.11603**   0.00888** 0.00904** 
Utilization (–1)   (–11.98)**   (–12.03)     (5.42)  (5.53) 
 
Percent of Advertisements  –0.00130**  0.00034** 
with Blue Eagle Emblem    (–5.50)   (4.86) 
 
Cross-Sections   66       66   30     30 
Observations 8372      8372  3823   3823 
 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.88      1.88  1.81    1.82 
 
